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1. Introduction 
 
This paper examines the relationship between new-firm startups and employment change in Great Brit-
ain. This relationship is of considerable policy importance, since national and sub-national governments 
in Britain have, for more than two decades, sought to raise business startup rates in order to enhance 
wealth- and job-creation. An example of a central government policy was the Enterprise Allowance 
Scheme (EAS). At its peak in 1987-88, public expenditure on EAS was virtually £200 million, subsidising 
more than 106,000 unemployed people to start a new business [Storey (1994)]. A second example is 
the Business Birth Rate Strategy initiated in Scotland in the early 1990s, which sought to raise new-firm 
formation rates. A third example was the Entrepreneurship Action Plan for Wales announced in 2001. 
The assumption of a strong positive relationship between increased new-firm startup rates and subse-
quent employment growth underpinned all three such policies. 
 
This paper tests for that underpinning. It begins by presenting the theoretical arguments for the presen-
ce of a relationship between startups and job creation, going on to provide an overview of current evi-
dence. The central theme of the paper is that, with the exception of a recent paper by Audretsch and 
Fritsch (2002) for Germany, the relationship between startups and job creation has previously been 
examined either with no time-lag or with only a short period lag.  
 
The current paper claims to make seven advances on prior work. The first is to construct and use a long-
run (1980-98) data set that facilitates a valid comparison between the results for Great Britain and 
Germany. A second innovation is the explicit choice of variables. It argues that the appropriate measure 
of new firm formation is the sectorally adjusted number of private sector new firms, normalised by the 
sectorally adjusted working population. It also argues that the appropriate measure of employment 
change is the sectorally adjusted private sector employment. Thirdly it incorporates, for the first time, 
data on private sector wages in the locality. Fourthly, the paper explicitly incorporates various tests for 
misspecification which virtually all models pass. Fifth, the paper explicitly corrects for multicollinearity 
caused by strong intertemporal correlations between startup rates for different periods. Sixth, it utilises 
the concept of the “Upas Tree” to see whether Scotland and Wales differ from England in the relation-
ship between startups and job creation. Seventh, and finally it links the findings to changes in Enterprise 
Policy both for the UK as a whole and for Scotland in particular. 
 
The key results in the paper call into question the impact of policies seeking to raise new firm formation, so 
as to enhance employment creation, particularly in areas where new firm formation rates are low.  Specifi-
cally we find that, in the 1980’s when national public policy was focussed on raising new firm formation, 
there is no evidence that this led to increased employment creation during that decade.  Furthermore, al-
though it is non significant for the UK as a whole in the 1980's, it is significantly negative for the North East 
of England, an area with notably low rates of new firm formation. 
 
In the 1990’s, when UK national policy shifts away from stimulating new firm formation, a positive relation-
ship emerges between firm formation and employment creation.  Crucially, however, in Scotland which 
implemented a policy to stimulate new firm births in the 90’s, a significant negative relationship between 
new firm births and employment creation appears in this decade. 
 
 
2. The Issues 
 
This section reviews the theoretical basis for believing a relationship exists between the extent to which 
a geographical area is “entrepreneurial” and the extent to which it is “economically successful”. We 
show there are a priori reasons for expecting a positive relationship, but that there are also reasons for 
expecting no relationship or, in extreme cases, a negative relationship. 
    5 
There are three reasons why more “entrepreneurial” areas might generate more jobs- where jobs are a 
measure of “economic success”. The first is that if “entrepreneurial” is reflected in “new-firm formati-
on” then these new firms themselves create jobs directly and so add to the stock of jobs. The second is 
that the new firms constitute a (real or imagined) competitive threat to existing firms, encouraging the 
latter to perform better [Disney, Haskel and Heden (2003)]. Finally, new firms provide a vehicle for the 
introduction of new ideas and innovation to an economy, which has been shown to be a key source of 
long-term economic growth [Romer (1986)]. Indeed Audretsch and Thurik (2001) argue that the role of 
new firms in technological development has been enhanced by a reduced importance of scale econo-
mies and an increasing degree of uncertainty in the world economy, creating more room for innovative 
entry. 
 
The reasons for not expecting firm formation rates to be related to job creation are also three-fold. The 
first is that new firms directly contribute only a very small proportion of the stock of jobs in the eco-
nomy [5.5% of the stock of UK employment in 1989 was in firms that had been born in the previous 
two years- Storey (1994)]. Secondly, most new firms were merely displacing existing firms without any 
observable gain either to the customer or to the economy [Storey and Strange (1992) show that 78% of 
sales of new firms are to firms in the same administrative county]. Finally, innovation is very much the 
exception rather than the rule amongst new firms. For example, during the 1990s, twice-yearly Surveys 
were taken of (primarily) small firms in the West Midlands.The proportion of firms claiming to have in-
troduced a product or service new to the marketplace in the prior twelve months varied from 4% to 
17% [Price Waterhouse Coopers (1999)]. 
 
A third set of arguments is that the scale of job creation in new firms varies considerably from firm to 
firm. Storey and Strange (1992) show that 2% of all new firms created 33% of jobs in new firms, re-
flecting the extent of skewness in the distribution of employment. This skewness is taken to reflect dif-
ferences in the human capital of founders [Frank (1988)] or their ability to learn [Jovanovic (1982)]. For 
these reasons job creation, even in new enterprises, may be more strongly influenced by the human 
capital of the founders, than by the absolute number of startups [Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg (1989), 
Van Praag and Cramer (2001)]. 
 
The case for a negative relationship derives from examining policies to stimulate new firm formation in 
“unenterprising” areas.  Since these are frequently areas where human capital is low, the new firms 
tend to be in easy to enter sectors such as vehicle-repairing, window cleaning and hairdressing [Storey 
and Strange (1992)]. Subsidising entry means entrants temporarily have a competitive advantage over 
incumbents who are forced out of business.  Once the subsidy is removed, the no-longer subsidised 
entrants may be forced out either by newly subsidised entrants or by re-entrants. The effect of this 
‘churn’ is to lower customer confidence leading to lower expenditure and hence lower employment. 
 
 
3. The Evidence 
 
Prior empirical studies of the relationship between “entrepreneurship” and “economic success” have 
adopted different approaches, yielding different results. Three studies, albeit using very different de-
pendent and independent variables, find a positive relationship. GEM (2000) examines the relationship 
across 21 countries between “total Entrepreneurial Activity” and per cent growth in GDP. They show 
that “Entrepreneurship is strongly associated with economic growth. Amongst nations with similar eco-
nomic structures, the correlation between entrepreneurship and economic growth exceeds 0.7 and is 
highly significant”. Second, Johnson and Parker (1996) find “robust evidence that growth in births (and 
reductions in deaths) significantly lowers unemployment”.
1 Finally, taking the period 1981-89, Ashcroft 
and Love (1996), find new-firm formation to be strongly associated with net employment change in 
Great Britain. 
                                                           
1 Their italics.    6 
 
Fritsch (1996), however, obtains more ambiguous results. In a pioneering study that can be considered 
as the fore-runner to this study, he examines 74 (former) West German planning regions, 1986-89. He 
finds “a positive statistical relationship between entry rates and employment change for manufacturing 
in the longer run, …(but)… this relationship proves to be negative for the service sector as well as for all 
sectors together” [Fritsch (1996), p. 247].  A recent paper by Audretsch and Fritsch (2002) provides new 
insights for (West) Germany. Taking the same 74 planning regions, they present three key findings. 
First, confirming the Fritsch (1996) findings, startup rates in the 1980s are found to be unrelated to 
employment change. Second, in the 1990s, those regions with higher startup rates have higher em-
ployment growth. Third, and perhaps most interesting, is that regions with high startup rates in the 
1980s had high employment growth in the 1990s.  
 
In summary therefore the evidence to date generally points to a significant and positive relationship 
between new firm formation and measures of employment creation.  There seems no prior empirical 
support for a negative relationship, although some non-significant relationships have been found. 
 
 
4. Modelling Issues 
 
The relationship to be modelled is of the simple form in Equation (1) below    
 
( ) CON BIR f EMP t t , 1 − = ∆  (1) 
 
where   t EMP ∆  = change in employment, 
1 − t BIR = firm birth rates at start of period, 
  CON  = control variables.  
 
(i)  Choice of Measures 
Whilst, in principle, the model is simple to estimate there are five clear problems of definition. The first 
relates to the measure of BIR to be used. Given that the units of account are geographical areas that 
vary in size, BIR needs to be normalised by a size measure. The denominator should both control for the 
different absolute sizes of the regions concerned, and represent the source from which startups or firm 
formations are most likely to come [Ashcroft, Love and Malloy (1991)]. The two variables normally used 
as denominators are the stock of existing firms, and the size of the regional workforce [Keeble, Walker 
and Robson (1993)]. This is called the Business Stock (BS) approach and the Labour Market (LM) ap-
proach, respectively. The BS approach assumes new firms arise from existing ones, whereas the LM ap-
proach assumes that new firms arise from (potential) workers.
2 The choice of measure can be highly 
significant. For example, for a given number of startups, regions which are equally large in terms of 
workforce but which are different in terms of average firm size, will have the same startup rate accord-
ing to the LM approach but different startup rates according to the BS approach.
3 Garofoli (1994) 
makes a robust case in favour of LM over BS. The latter, he argues, is misleading in areas with small 
numbers of (generally large) firms. Here small numbers of new firms would provide an artificially high 
                                                           
2 In Ashcroft and Love (1996), total population is used as denominator. However, this assumes that new firms 
may arise from children or elderly persons as well. This seems less plausible.    7 
birth rate, primarily because of the small denominator. Audretsch and Fritsch (1994) also show that, in 
West Germany, the statistical relationship between unemployment and startup activity crucially depends 
on the BS or LM methods used to measure startup rates.
4  We favour the Garofoli arguments and in this 
paper present only results from the LM approach.
5   
 
(ii) Lags 
The second key problem relates to the lag structure specified in Equation (1). The case for the lag is that 
the employment impact of new firms is not likely to be immediate. Storey (1985), for example, shows 
that new manufacturing firms are generally eight or nine years old by the time they reach their peak 
employment, at which time they are about twice the size they were at the end of Year 1. However, be-
cause of their high exit rates, total employment in a cohort of new firms is lower in Year 5 than in Year 
1. This means that the maximum employment impact of a cohort depends on the scale of these two 
influences and is an empirical, rather than theoretical, issue. 
 
The above discussion is framed in terms of simple arithmetic, but more complex social processes could 
also influence the lag. For example, new businesses started in time period t may stimulate the formation 
of other new firms in period t+1. This may be because the t period firms constitute a market for the t+1 
firms; alternatively the success of the t firms could stimulate individuals to seek to emulate them, so the 
t firms become “role-models”. In turn, the t+1 firms stimulate more firms in later time periods, with the 
result that employment in that economy in t+n is stimulated. Theory, again however, is not helpful in 
specifying the value of n. Nevertheless it seems clear that this is likely to be a period of at least a dec-
ade.  
 
The above theoretical arguments discourage the use of contemporaneous startup rate variables in the 
model, i.e., employment change in period t being explained by new-firm startups in period t. Although 
correlations might be significant, the implied causal relation from births to (immediate) employment 
growth is potentially misleading. Positive correlations between startup rates and growth in the same 
period are often due to reversed causality, i.e., regions with high growth attracting new firms.
6 In our 




                                                                                                                                                                      
3 In Van Stel, Dielbandhoesing, Van den Heuvel and Storey (2002) the (differences between the) two approa-
ches are illustrated in detail by means of a numerical example for actual GB data. 
4 In Audretsch and Fritsch (1994) the business stock approach is called the ecological approach. 
5 Analyses comparing the LM and BS approach are in Van Stel and Storey (2002). In that paper we also pay 
extensive attention to some other empirical matters discussed later in this section, such as the sector adjust-
ment of the startup rates and the impact of public sector employment on regression results. 
6 Even if there is a lag in this reversed causality process, the measured correlation is often still positive, because 
of path dependency in the growth performance of regions.    8 
(iii) Sectoral  Comparisons 
A third problem relates to differences in industrial structure between regions. This raises the question of 
whether the different sectoral structures of regions should be taken into account, since this influences 
both the number of startups and also employment change. Taking only the difference between services 
and manufacturing, startup rates are higher in service industries than in manufacturing [Audretsch and 
Fritsch (2002)], partly because entry barriers are lower, Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) is also likely to be 
lower and, for some services, demand is high. For all these reasons, regions with a high share of services 
in the local economy are more likely to have higher startup rates than regions with a low service share.  
But this does not necessarily mean these regions are also more “entrepreneurial”, in the sense that 
startup rates are higher for each sector of the local economy (or most sectors of the local economy). 
Therefore, to correct for different sectoral structures, the Ashcroft, Love and Malloy (1991) shift-share 
procedure is applied to derive a measure of sector-adjusted startup activity. The sector-adjusted number 
of startups is defined as the number of new firms in a region that can be expected to be observed if the 
composition of industries was identical across all regions. Thus, the measure adjusts the raw data by 
imposing the same composition of industries on each region [Audretsch and Fritsch (2002)]. An identical 
process is used to derive a measure of sectorally adjusted employment change.
7 
 
Another sector issue concerns the impact of the public sector on estimated model coefficients. Ideally, 
analysis should be restricted to private sector enterprises and private sector employment. Unfortunately, 
however, both private and state-owned enterprises can be present within some SIC groups. Further-
more, SIC groups with a relatively large employment share of public sector organizations (such as uni-
versities and hospitals) may disturb estimations as changes in public sector employment may create a 
bias in the estimated employment effect of new-firm startups. Therefore, we eliminate SIC groups 
dominated by state-owned enterprises or other public sector organizations from our analysis.
8      
 
(iv) ‘Control’  variables 
A fourth issue relates to the choice of control variables (CON) used in Equation 1. In addition to the 
sectoral composition effects, noted above, previous studies have shown urban and rural areas differ in 
both employment change and in new-firm formation rates. In their review of regional variations in firm 
birth rates, Reynolds, Storey and Westhead (1994) pointed to urban areas consistently having higher 
formation rates in the 1980s than non-urban areas. Employment change, however, has been more 
mixed, with an urban-rural shift in the 1970s and 1980s [Fothergill and Gudgin (1979)] but a more 
                                                           
7 In Van Stel, Dielbandhoesing, Van den Heuvel and Storey (2002) the shift-share procedure is illustrated in 
detail by means of a numerical example for actual GB data. 
8 This involves SIC92 industries L, M, and N (Public administration, defence and compulsory social security; Edu-
cation; and Health and social work, respectively) for  post-1991 data, and SIC80 industry 9 (“other services”) 
for pre-1991 data; we utilise data according to different SICs before and after 1991, see Table A1b in Appendix 
1.    9 
mixed picture in more recent times [Green and Turok (2000)]. Account of urban/rural differences is 
taken by the inclusion of a population density variable, and by Standard Region dummies.
9 
 
Another control factor is the nature of the labour market, reflected in local wage rates. Rees and Shah 
(1986) assume the welfare maximising individual chooses between utility in self-employment compared 
with paid employment, for which wages are taken as the proxy.  Hence rises in wage rates would be 
expected to lead to movements into wage-employment and out of self-employment, consistent with a 
positive effect on employment change (which in the present study is defined to include employees only). 
Furthermore, wage rises may also stimulate labour supply which could also lead to increased employ-
ment at the regional level.  However, there is also a possible negative effect as a higher price of labour 
may lead to a lower demand for labour (substitution between capital and labour).
10  These opposite 
effects make the sign of wage rates indeterminate from theory. 
 
A further control factor relates to the issue of reversed causality discussed earlier. Even if we include 
lagged startup rates only, the employment impact of new-firm startups might be overestimated, due to 
positive path dependency in the economic performance of regions (i.e., the business cycle effect). We 
correct for this by including lagged employment growth.
11 
 
(v)  Public Policy and Region-specific effects 
The 1980’s and 1990’s saw radical changes in Enterprise Policy in the UK. Greene (2002) argues that 
the decade of the 1980’s saw, following the election of a Conservative government in 1979, the first 
explicit attempt to create an enterprise culture in Britain.  Policy was directed towards maximising the 
number of new business starts so as to achieve this ‘enterprise culture’ and to seek to create jobs so as 
to offset the high levels of unemployment.  In the 1990’s, however, British policy changed towards a 
focus on established business with “growth potential”. This we refer to as the policy effect. 
 
In addition we also argue for the presence of region-specific effects reflecting the major cultural differ-
ences, within Great Britain, in attitudes towards enterprise and self-employment. We call this the Upas 
                                                           
9 According to Audretsch and Fritsch (2002, p. 120), who also use population density as a control in their re-
gressions for Germany, “Population density here represents all kinds of regional influences such as availability 
of qualified labour, house prices, local demand and the level of knowledge spillovers”.  
10 For a selection of European countries, Van Stel (1999) estimates the real wage elasticity (the response of la-
bour demand on an exogenous rise in real wages at constant output level and price of capital) to lie between –
0.2 and –0.4 in the period 1970-1994. 
11 The concept of using lagged dependent variables to correct for reversed causality is known in the economet-
ric literature as Granger-causality. The Granger (1969) approach to the question of whether x causes y is to see 
how much of the current y can be explained by past values of y and then to see whether adding lagged values 
of x can improve the explanation. y is said to be Granger-caused by x if x helps in the prediction of y, or equiva-
lently if the coefficients on the lagged x’s are statistically significant (Audretsch, Carree and Thurik, 2001).    10 
Tree effect. The term was originally used by Checkland (1976) to describe economic change in the city 
of Glasgow, and was derived from a description of the Upas Tree that was native to Java. According to 
legend, the Upas Tree was able to destroy other growths for a radius of 15 miles, and Checkland 
viewed it as analagous to the destructive effect that the heavy engineering sector had upon the growth 
of other industries in Glasgow for much of the twentieth century.
12 We use it to characterise Scotland 
and Wales, both of which appear to have a long-standing antipathy to “entrepreneurship”, but also 
North East England [McDonald and Coffield (1992); Greene, Mole and Storey (2004)]. 
 
However, the policy and the region-specific effects interact with one another. This is because, whilst 
Britain as a whole, in the 1990’s, was shifting its policy away from a focus on business start-ups, Scot-
land explicitly chose the opposite policy. It established a “business birth rate” strategy [Fraser of Al-
lander (2001)] the focus of which was to raise new firm formation in that country. Account therefore 
has to be taken of these very different policy environments in Britain in 1980’s and 1990’s and of the 
differences between Scotland and the rest of Britain in the 1990’s. 
 
We investigate the impact of new firms on employment change separately for the 1980s and the 1990s 
to see whether effects differ between these two decades. We also incorporate slope dummies for Stan-
dard Regions to see whether effects for certain regions deviate from the overall effect for Great Britain. 
 
 
5. Variables and Data Sources 
 
The data used is at the spatial aggregation level of NUTS3 regions in Great Britain. This is county level in 
England and Wales, and local authority region level in Scotland. In this partitioning, Great Britain com-
prises 60 regions, each disaggregated by six sectors. This facilitates correction for sectoral differences 
between regions, i.e., to apply the shift-share procedure described below. Different regional and sec-
toral classifications in the original data files meant some linking operations were performed to ensure 
uniformity for the whole period 1980-98. These linking operations and the exact classification schemes 
employed are reported in Appendix 1. The agricultural sector is excluded, as this sector is fundamentally 
different from the rest of the economy, having, during this period, exceptionally low startup and death 
rates. 
 
Variable definitions and their sources are now provided: 
Sector adjusted (lagged) employment change. This is the change in regional employment, expressed in 
percentages (excluding agriculture). For each region, sectoral employment growth rates are weighted by 
                                                           
12 To our knowledge Lloyd and Mason (1984) were the first to use Checkland's analogy in this context.     11 
employment per sector for Great Britain as a whole. Data on employment are taken from the Census of 
Employment and the Annual Employment Survey and are supplied by Nomis. Employment figures in-
clude both full-time and part-time employees, and exclude self-employed workers and unpaid family 
workers. Employment is measured in September of each year.  
 
Sector adjusted startup rate. This is the sectoral startup rate, weighted by employment per sector for 
Great Britain as a whole . Using this weighting implies an identical sector structure for each region. Re-
gional employment, rather than regional workforce, is used as the denominator for the LM approach, 
because of greater data reliability. Startups in the agricultural sector are again excluded. Startups are 
measured as VAT registrations and these data are supplied by Small Business Service. The consistency 
and general availability of this data source make it the most generally useful source of data on firm 
formation for the UK as a whole [Ashcroft, Love and Malloy (1991)]. Startup rates are expressed as the 
number of startups per thousand workers (LM approach). 
 
Population density. Data on both population and area of the regions are obtained from the Office for 
National Statistics. The variable is expressed in thousands of inhabitants per square kilometre. 
 
Wage growth. This variable measures changes in regional wage rates. We use data from the New Earn-
ings Survey Panel Data-set (NESPD), which is operated by the Office for National Statistics. The estimates 
of regional wage rates refer to average hourly earnings excluding overtime payments. The samples from 
which the mean wages are calculated relate to full time employees whose pay was unaffected by ab-
sence during the survey week (which falls in April of each year) and exclude those employed in agricul-





The model is estimated using OLS. Each regression is estimated cross-sectionally, i.e., using 60 observa-
tions (one for each region). Because of missing (employment) data, the region Orkney/Shetland/Western 
Isles had to be dropped, generating a total of 59 observations. To test whether startup activity has a 
different impact on employment growth in different time periods several models are estimated. 
 
Recalling that a key objective is to test for short or long-run relationships this section begins by examin-
ing the relationship between startups, 1980-83, on employment change 1984-91; then it examines 
startups in the period 1987-90 on employment change 1991-98. This provides an initial assessment of 
whether the short-term impact of startups differed between the 1980s and the 1990s. Next, we look at    12 
possible region-specific deviations in the effect of startups on employment growth. In the third subsec-
tion we investigate whether estimation results are affected by the periods in which startup rates are 
measured in terms of recession or boom  periods. The fourth subsection investigates long-run effects. 
We also pay attention to the interpretation of the magnitude of the estimated effects. Finally, we com-
pare our results with other studies. 
 
In all instances, four regression diagnostics are presented. These are first, the Jarque-Bera test on nor-
mality of the disturbances; second, the Lagrange Multiplier test on heteroscedasticity; third, the Ramsey 
RESET test on general misspecification of the model. To facilitate direct evaluation of these tests p-
values are shown. For all three tests the null hypothesis corresponds to “correct estimates”, i.e., normal-
ity at the Jarque-Bera test, no heteroscedasticity at the Lagrange Multiplier test and no sign of misspeci-
fication at the Ramsey RESET test. 
 
Finally, the fact that the data relate to spatial variations raises the potential problem of spatial autocor-
relation, an issue “which has been widely ignored in the econometric literature, including most previous 
work on spatial variations in new firm formation” [Keeble, Walker and Robson (1993), p. 34]. Following 
Keeble, Walker and Robson (1993), account is taken of this by including Standard Region intercept 
dummies in the equations.
13 To see whether spatial autocorrelation is actually present in our regres-
sions, we report the Durbin-Watson statistic.
14 We test for positive spatial autocorrelation, implying that 
the null hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation is accepted (not rejected) if the DW test statistic is 




(i)  Startups and employment change in the 1980s and the 1990s: short-term effects 
Table 1 presents the regression results for the 1980s and the 1990s. Startup rates are related to subse-
quent employment growth, while controlling for population density, wage growth, lagged employment 
growth, and regional dummies. All control variables are measured prior to the period of the dependent 
variable. For the 1990s regression we experimented with the lag for wage growth which resulted in 
inclusion of wage growth for the period 1985-89 (based on statistical fit).  
 
                                                           
13 For this purpose the county Greater London is added to the South East region. This is because there is only 
one county within the London region in our data set. 
14 Following Ashcroft and Love (1996), we present the data to the estimation by county within each Standard Region; 
it follows that many adjacent observations are from contiguous counties.  
15 We test for positive autocorrelation as neighbouring regions may be expected to benefit from each other 
(spillover effects).    13 
The final rows show all diagnostic tests are passed (p-values are well above 0.05), except for the RESET 
test in the 1990s, possibly indicating a missing variable. As regards spatial autocorrelation, the null hy-
pothesis of no autocorrelation is accepted (not rejected) as the DW test statistic exceeds the upper 
bound critical value (which is about 2, in our case).
16 
 
The impact of startup activity on subsequent regional employment change is different for the 1980s and 
the 1990s. In the 1980s startups and employment change are unrelated while in the 1990s startups 
have a significantly positive impact on employment growth. The bigger employment impact of 1987-90 
births compared to 1980-83 births might reflect that the importance of new and small firms in the 
process of innovation and economic growth has increased in the last two decades of the 20
th century. In 
this interpretation Great Britain would have moved from a more “managed” type of economy toward a 
more “entrepreneurial” type of economy [Audretsch and Thurik (2001)]. However, perhaps a more 
plausible explanation is that the increased employment impact reflects “Enterprise Policy” changes, with 
public policy switching from being quantity-oriented in the 1980s towards being more quality-oriented 
in the 1990s [Greene (2002)]. 
 
As for the control variables, we see a negative impact of population density, and a positive impact of 
both wage growth and lagged employment growth. The latter effect points at positive path depend-
ency. Regions that perform relatively well in a certain period, still perform relatively well in the next pe-
riod. 
                                                           
16 We realise that the Durbin-Watson test should be interpreted with caution in the presence of a lagged de-
pendent variable in the model (Stewart, 1991, p. 168). However, as the DW test statistic is clearly greater than 
the upper bound critical value, we think it is safe to assume that our estimates do not suffer from first-order 
spatial autocorrelation. Furthermore, when the Standard Region intercept dummies are removed, the DW test 
statistic falls to 2.10 for the 1980s regression and to 1.64 for the 1990s regression. The latter value falls within 
the inconclusive region, indicating that the regional dummies are indeed helpful in correcting for spatial 
autocorrelation.    14 
 
Table 1: Determinants of regional employment growth (%), short-term equations 1980s and 1990s 
  Employment growth 1984-91 
 









Average startup rate,  
1980-83 (left column) 







1981 (left column) 







1981-85 (left column) 






Lagged employment growth, 
1981-84 (left column) 






2 0.281  0.696 
JB test: [p-value]  [0.517]  [0.820] 
LM het. test: [p-value]  [0.630]  [0.264] 
RESET test: [p-value]  [0.743] [0.015] 
DW test  2.23  2.18 
Note: Intercept dummies for Standard Regions not reported. Employment growth rates and startup rates are sector 
adjusted. Employment growth is measured exclusive of the non-private sector. Absolute t-values in parentheses. 
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(ii)  Regional specific effects 
In this subsection we investigate whether certain regions deviate in the employment effect of new-firm 
startups. For this purpose we compute slope dummies (startup rate multiplied by regional dummy) for 
the (ten) Standard Regions. Given the specifications in table 1 (hence, including all intercept dummies), 
we include, one at a time, a slope dummy for each Standard Region. Those slope dummies which are 
significant at 10% level when included separately, are included in table 2. For the 1980s this is the North 
East region, and for the 1990s Scotland and Wales. The effects for the other regions are not significantly 
different from the overall effect. The improved value for the RESET test for the 1990s regression (compared 
to table 1) implies that the slope dummies for Scotland and Wales contribute to the validity of the model. 
 
For the 1980s, the overall effect of startup rate is nil, except for the North East where new-firm startups 
contribute negatively to employment growth in that region in the 1980s. For the 1990s the overall startup 




It will be recalled that after October 1993 Scotland implements an active policy to raise business birth 
rates (BBRS) [Fraser of Allander Institute (2001)]. Although the periods studied in the current paper do 
not entirely coincide with the period during which the BBRS is active (from 1994 onwards), the negative 
value for the Scotland dummy indicates that the BBRS actually had a negative effect on job creation in 
Scotland. 
 
The results from table 2 call into question the impact of policies seeking to raise new-firm formation, for 
two reasons. First, in the 1980’s, when UK policy is to stimulate starts, there is no effect on employment 
in the UK as a whole, and even a negative effect for the North East. Second, in the 1990’s there is a 
significantly positive overall effect after the UK policy changed towards more emphasis on established 
businesses with the potential to grow. However, for Scotland, which has a business birth rate strategy 
in the 1990s, the effect is negative.  
 
 
                                                           
17 The slope dummies refer to the deviation from the overall effect. For instance, the significant parameter esti-
mate for Wales means that the effect for Wales deviates significantly from England. It does not mean that it 
deviates significantly from zero. Indeed, the effect for Wales is –0.3 which is not significant (t-value –0.3). The 
effect for Scotland is –2.7 which is significantly different from zero at 10% level (t-value –1.8).    16 
 
Table 2: Examining region-specific deviations in employment impact of startups 
  Employment growth 1984-91 
 





















































2 0.335  0.747 
JB test: [p-value]  [0.493]  [0.030] 
LM het. test: [p-value]  [0.843]  [0.534] 
RESET test: [p-value]  [0.225] [0.576] 
DW test  2.30  2.22 
Note: Intercept dummies for Standard Regions not reported. Employment growth rates and startup rates are sector 
adjusted. Employment growth is measured exclusive of the non-private sector. Except for startup rate slope dum-
mies, variable specifications are as in Table 1. Absolute t-values in parentheses. 
 
 
(iii)  Recession births versus boom births 
In the previous sections we argued that the different short-term impacts of startups in the early and late 
1980s may have been caused by “Enterprise Policy” changes. An alternative explanation is that the 
1980-83 startups may be a different type of startups, compared with the 1987-90 startups. The obvious 
difference is that, while 1980-83 were recession years, 1987-90 was a “boom” period. During reces-
sions, a higher proportion of startups may be from individuals with lower human capital, who find em-   17 
ployment in the employee labour market more difficult [Cressy (1996)]. These startups may be less likely 
to generate jobs. On the other hand, during a period of economic prosperity, it may be the more “en-
trepreneurial” type of person who starts a business. This type of startup may be more likely to generate 
jobs in the short and the long-run. So, while recession births may be the result of “push”-factors being 
at work (possibly creating fewer jobs), boom births may be more “pull-factor” in nature (possibly creat-
ing more jobs).  
 
To test this we examine in Table 3 the relationship between firm births in the 1990s recession and 
short-term employment change. Using the same control variables as those reported in Table 2, we esti-
mate a regression in which employment change in the period 1993-98 is explained by the average 
startup rate over the period 1990-93. To facilitate comparison, the results from the right column of 
table 2 are reported again in table 3.  The results are similar: we find a significant positive impact, im-
plying that the lack of a relationship in the 1980s is not because of the choice of recessionary years.
18 
Instead, it seems to be the case that (new) firms in the late 1980s and early 1990s contribute more to 
employment change than firms started in the early 1980s irrespective of macro-economic conditions.  
                                                           
18 The estimated effect for the recession period is even stronger, although not significantly. As regards the dum-
my variables, the deviations of Wales and Scotland seem to be smaller compared to table 2 (t-values –1.3). 
However, the isolated effects are nil for both Wales (effect –0.8; t-value –0.4) and Scotland (effect –0.7; t-value 
–0.3), while the effect for the English regions is significantly positive. This implies that Wales and Scotland still 
lag behind in the employment effect of new firms started in the period 1990-93.    18 
 
Table 3: Examining the impact of recession or boom period 
  Employment growth 1991-98 
 









Startup rate, overall effect 
1987-90 (left column) 









































2 0.747  0.737 
JB test: [p-value]  [0.030]  [0.473] 
LM het. test: [p-value]  [0.534]  [0.289] 
RESET test: [p-value]  [0.576] [0.534] 
DW test  2.22  2.51 
Note: Intercept dummies for Standard Regions not reported. Employment growth rates and startup rates are sector 
adjusted. Employment growth is measured exclusive of the non-private sector. Except for startup rate slope dum-
mies, variable specifications are as in Table 1. Absolute t-values in parentheses. 
 
 
(iv)  A long-term effect? 
In this subsection we test for long-run effects. Given our data set we can only test for long-run effects 
for employment growth in the 1990s, as we have no startup data prior to 1980. The easiest way to test 
for long-run effects is to run separate regressions which include different lags of the startup rate. Using 
the same control variables as in table 2, the coefficients of startup rate in separate regressions explain-
ing employment change 1991-98, are 1.88 for for 1987-90 startups, 2.25 for 1984-87 startups, and 
2.44 for 1980-83 startups. So, the impact increases with the lag, seemingly indicating that the long-run 
effect exceeds the short-run effect.    19 
 
However, we must be cautious in comparing these coefficients. To avoid multicollinearity we estimated 
the impact of the startup rates from different periods in separate regressions. A disadvantage of this 
approach is that, because of the strong intertemporal correlation between startup rates (correlations of 
up to 0.9), the estimated startup rate coefficient may pick up some of the effect of startup activity from 
other periods. This means comparing coefficients of the long-term and short-term equations is complex. 
 
A better way of establishing the individual impacts of startup rate variables from different periods draws 
upon the distributed lag literature [Stewart (1991)]. By including startup rates from different periods in 
one regression, but imposing restrictions on the individual parameters, an accurate approximation of 
the shape of the lag response can be obtained. In the Almon method, parameter restrictions are impo-
sed in such a way that the coefficients of the lagged variables are a polynomial function of the lag 
length. In this way the startup rate coefficients are reparameterized in a “smooth” way.  
 
We apply the Almon method for a quadratic polynomial function (i.e., a polynomial of second degree). 
This choice corresponds to imposing one parameter restriction.
19 The results are shown in Table 4, with 
further details presented in Appendix 2.  
                                                           
19 This can be seen as follows. In the unrestricted regression three startup rate variables are included in the 
model, while in the first unrestricted regression column, only two variables are included (COMBI1 and COMBI2 
in Table 4). In the second unrestricted regression column, only one startup rate variable is included (COMBI3), 
and this corresponds to two parameter restrictions. The startup rate coefficients in the restricted regressions are 
linear combinations of the combinatory variable coefficients. See equation (A3) in Appendix 2.    20 
Table 4: Examining the lag structure 





















COMBI3 = -2(X-1+X-2) 
 
    -0.53 
(3.8) 
 





















2 0.737  0.743  0.748 
JB test: [p-value]  [0.062] [0.087] [0.069] 
LM het. test: [p-value]  [0.554] [0.578] [0.581] 
RESET test: [p-value]  [0.657] [0.661] [0.642] 
DW test  2.21 2.21 2.22 
Validity Almon restrictions: 
F-test statistic 








Note: Except for startup rates, model specifications are as in right column Table 2. Intercept dummies for Standard 
Regions, startup rate slope dummies for Scotland and Wales, and coefficients of population density, wage growth, 
and lagged employment growth are not reported. Absolute t-values in parentheses. Null hypothesis for JB test, LM 
het. test, RESET test, and DW test is “correct model specification”. Null hypothesis for F-test is “valid restrictions”. 
Critical values for F-tests are according to F(1;41) and F(2;41) distributions. 
 
 
In Table 4, regression results using unrestricted regression (i.e., free estimation) and restricted regres-
sions (i.e., using the Almon method) are presented. For the unrestricted regression we see that t-values 
of the separate startup rates are low. This is due to multicollinearity. In the first restricted regression 
column a corrected lag pattern is presented. We see that the impact of the startup rate 1984-87 is    21 
strongest. The impact of 1980-83 startups, however, is zero: the t-value is extremely low.
20 This pattern 
suggests that the lag is approximately 4 to 7 years. The validity of imposing the Almon restriction is 
formally confirmed by the F-test on parameter restrictions. 
 
However, as t-values for both combinatory variables are low, we suspect that multicollinearity may still 
influence results in the middle column to some extent. Therefore, we test an additional restriction. As 
both parameter estimate and t-value of 1980-83 startup rate are low, we impose the effect of 1980-83 
startups to be zero. This extra restriction, which can be written as  0 3 = β , also implies that the em-
ployment impacts of 1987-90 startups and 1984-87 startups are equal.
21 In the last column we see that 
both the unrestricted and the restricted parameter estimates are significant. Also, the F-test on valid 
restrictions is not rejected. We therefore conclude that the employment impact of 1980-83 startups is 
zero and that the employment impacts of 1987-90 startups and 1984-87 startups are equal and signifi-
cantly positive. 
 
Using the estimation results from the last column in Table 4, the employment impact of the startup rate 
can be written as a function of the lag length of the startup rate as  () ()
2 * * 3 53 . 0 3 58 . 1 * i i
i − = β , 
where 
* i  is the lag length in years.
22 The employment impact of startup rates is maximised after 4.5 
years and extinguished after 9 years, counting backwards from 1991. So, according to this formula, 
startups from 1986-87 contribute most to employment growth 1991-98, whereas new-firm startups 
founded in 1983 or earlier do not contribute to employment growth beyond 1991.  
 
The different results for the unrestricted and restricted regression clearly demonstrate the necessity to 
take account of intertemporal correlations between the different lags of the startup rate.  
 
(v)  Magnitude of the effects 
We now examine the magnitude of the effects. The coefficients from “separate regressions” overesti-
mate the employment effect as these coefficients partly reflect the impact of new-firm startups from 
different periods, as was shown above. To establish the correct average impact of one new-firm startup, 
                                                           
20 Recall that in the restricted regression columns in Table 4, the coefficients of the startup rate variables 1987-
90, 1984-87, and 1980-83 are linear combinations of the coefficients of the combinatory variables COMBI1, 
COMBI2, and COMBI3. In other words, the bold-printed coefficients are restricted parameter estimates.  
21 This is clear when the restriction  0 3 = β  is substituted in equation (A3) in Appendix 2: this results in 
2 2 1 2γ β β − = = . Again, we refer to Appendix 2 for further details. 
22 The lag length in years is denoted as 
* i . One unit in i  corresponds to a period of three years, i.e.,  3
* i i = . 
Again, details are in Appendix 2.    22 
we use the coefficients from the last column of table 4. The estimated parameter of the sector adjusted 
startup rate 1987-90 is 1.06. But this requires interpretation. The dependent variable equals 
() 1991 1991 1998 100 Empl Empl Empl − , where Empl stands for employment. The independent vari-
able equals  () 1987
1990
1987
4 1000 Empl NFF
i∑
=
, where NFF stands for new-firm formation. 
 
Due to data limitations we use four times 1987-employment, instead of the sum of employment over 
the years 1987-1990. For simplicity we assume that employment in 1987 equals employment in 1991, 
so the impact of one new-firm startup on absolute employment change is (1.06×(1000/4))/100=2.7. So, 
ceteris paribus, one new firm started in the period 1987-90 on average created 2.7 net new jobs in the 
period 1991-98.
23 The employment impact of 1984-87 is also 2.7 jobs per startup. Note that these jobs 
are additional to the jobs created by the 1987-90 startups. 
 
(vi)  Comparing these results with those from other studies 
Our findings for Great Britain show similarities to those of Audretsch and Fritsch (2002) for German 
regions. They find no short-term effect on employment of startups in the early to mid 1980s, but they 
do find a short-term employment effect of the early 1990s startups.
24 The common finding, for both 
Britain and Germany, is that the short-term effect of new-firm startups is higher in the 1990s than in 
the 1980s. 
 
Our results for the 1980s, however, differ from those of Ashcroft and Love (1996) for virtually the same 
British counties. As noted earlier, they find a strong positive effect of new firms started in the period 
1980-88 on net employment change in the period 1981-89. They employ a model in which both em-
ployment change and new-firm formation are explained with only a one year lag, allowing for interde-
pendencies between these two variables. The employment effect in their study is certainly stronger than 
our short-term result for the 1980s. 
 
One possible explanation of the differences may again be the different lag structures employed in the 
two models. In their model Ashcroft and Love relate new-firm formation 1980-88 to net employment 
change 1981-89, whereas in this paper the lags are of a minimum of three years (taking the mid year of 
                                                           
23 It is important to realize that these 2.7 jobs do not necessarily have to be created in the new firms themsel-
ves. It is also possible that (part of) these jobs are created in incumbent firms, but that this is induced by com-
petitive pressure from the new entries. In other words, the 2.7 jobs is the total net effect; we cannot distinguish 
between direct and indirect employment effects. 
24 Contrary to the present paper, Audretsch and Fritsch do not control for region-specific effects (by means of 
regional dummies), or wage growth.    23 
our startup rate variables as reference year).
25 Given the findings of this paper that the relationship 
strengthens over time, we believe our results to be more robust. 
 
 
7. Discussion and Implications 
In contrast with the expectations of the policy makers at the time this paper finds no evidence that 
changes in UK new firm formation rates in the 1980-83 period explained changes in employment 1984–
91. Indeed for the “unenterprising” and high unemployment area of the North East of England, raising 
rates of new firm formation is associated with employment reduction. It is only later in the decade that 
increased rates of new firm formation nationally appear to lead to job creation. Nevertheless the 1980’s 
was a decade in which national policy focussed on raising new firm formation as a key strategy for cre-
ating jobs and lowering unemployment. 
That policy, however, began to be reviewed in the early 1990’s and, by 1993, had been radically 
switched. Instead of a focus on startups, British policy, with the exception of Scotland, was directed 
towards, established, rather than new firms, and the job creation impact of new firms in that decade, 
nationally, was positive and significant.  
Scotland, however, adopted the reverse strategy. It sought, explicitly, to raise new firm fornation rate as 
a mechanism to promote job creation. Our results suggest Scotland committed a serious policy error in 
not following the rest of the UK.  We show that, in the UK, new firm formation in the 1987-90 period 
was significantly positively associated with employment growth in the 1991-8 period. In Scotland how-
ever, increases in new firm formation lead to falling employment. The results for Scotland therefore 
provide no support for policies which seek to raise new firm formation as a mechanism for stimulating 
job creation, particularly in areas deemed to be “lacking in enterprise.” Similar reservations apply to 
Northern England in the 1980's when increases in new firm formation were associated with employ-
ment reduction. 
 
Our findings are important for public policy makers for several reasons. First, the considerably bigger 
short-term (and possibly long-term) employment impact of 1990s births, compared with early 1980s 
births, is likely to reflect “Enterprise Policy” changes. As Greene (2002) argues, the 1980s in Britain was 
                                                           
25 Note that a lag of three years in the present paper is not comparable with the one year lag used by Ashcroft 
and Love. In their method, the one year lag is counted backward from the end year of the employment change 
period, whereas we count back from the start year of the employment change period. So the lags in the present 
paper are considerably larger than the difference between 3 and 1 year suggests. In fact, in Ashcroft and Love, 
the years in which employment change and startup activity are measured display an 80% overlap, possibly re-
sulting in the reversed causality problems described earlier. In the present paper we deliberately choose non-
overlapping periods.    24 
a decade in which the key objective was to maximise the number of business startups. In contrast, the 
1990s saw a shift towards policies to improve the “quality” of the SME sector as a whole. Given that 
major policy shift it is unsurprising - although reassuring- to observe bigger employment impacts in the 
1990s, than in the previous decade. 
 
Nevertheless this paper makes it clear that increases in birth rates can lead to additional job creation in 
the short and medium term. Much less clear is whether a public policy-induced increase in birth rates is 
a cost-effective way of enhancing employment in the medium term. Indeed our interpretation of our 
findings is that it is not for two reasons. The first is that the only area, in the 1990s, with a clear (public) 
policy to promote new-firm births was Scotland. Yet it was Scotland, (along with Wales), where the job 
creation impact of a new startup was significantly lower than elsewhere.
26 
 
Secondly, the key finding is that startups had a much greater impact on job creation in the 1990s than 
in the 1980s, even though raising the startup rate was the key policy objective in the 1980s. Our inter-
pretation is that “birth rate policies” lead to individuals with limited human capital -who are often un-
employed- being encouraged to start in business. Such individuals are likely to be very transitory busi-
ness owners and very unlikely to start and develop businesses with employees [Storey and Strange 
(1992)]. This suggests that, if the objective is to enhance employment, implementing old- fashioned 
“birth rate” policies is difficult to justify from this research. 
 
Unfortunately current UK policy documents appear to signal a return to such policies. HM Treasury 
(2002) refers consistently to an “enterprise gap”, and in its Foreward says “...and across the UK, start-
up rates in the best performing areas are ten times those of the worst, contributing to an enterprise gap 
in our inner cities of 88,000 companies, £5 billion in turnover and tens of thousands of jobs… we can-
not close that overnight”. The clear implication is that it is current policy to seek to close the gap by 
raising new firm formation, particularly in “unenterprising” areas. The lessons from this paper are that 
public policies to raise new firm formation, particularly in “unenterprising” areas are likely to be unpro-
ductive at best and counter-productive at worst. 
 
 
                                                           
26 In 2002 Scottish Enterprise announced the effective abolition of its Business Birth Rate Strategy, replacing it 
with a greater focus on SMEs with potential for growth. However, in 2001, an Entrepreneurship Action Plan for 
Wales was announced with a £300 million budget, one key element of which was to raise birth rates of firms in 
Wales to the UK average by 2006 [National Assembly for Wales (2001)].    25 
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APPENDIX 1: Data sources 
 
The various startup rate and employment change variables that are used in this report are all con-
structed from a data base which contains four basic variables: startups, closures, number of enterprises, 
and employment. This database was constructed by EIM. These four variables are available at the sec-
toral (1-digit) and regional (NUTS3) aggregation level for the period 1980-99. By and large, each of 
these four variables is available on a yearly basis according to uniform regional and sectoral classifica-
tions, for the whole period 1980-99. Achieving this uniformity is not straightforward, since the crude 
data were delivered according to different regional and sectoral classifications. In this appendix the ex-
act regional and sectoral aggregation levels, at which the four variables are available in the EIM-data 




In Tables A1a and A1b, we give an overview of the different classifications (regional and sectoral), ac-
cording to which the four variables are available in the basic data files. Also, the exact years for which 
the variables are available (for employment there are some missing years), are tabulated. 
Table A1a: Available years and classification schemes in basic data files: startups, closures and num-
ber of enterprises 
a 
Period  Available years  Regional classification  Sectoral classification 
1980-1993 All  pre-LGR 
b VTC 
c 
1994-1999 All  post-LGR  SIC92 
a The figures of these variables are supplied by Small Business Service. 
b LGR = local government reorganisation 1995-98. 
c VTC = VAT Trade Classification. This is effectively SIC68. 
 
Table A1b: Available years and classification schemes in basic data files: employment 
a 
Period  Available years  Regional classification  Sectoral classification 
1980-1991  1981; ’84; ‘87; ’89; ‘91  pre-LGR 
b  SIC80 
1991-1999  1991; ’93; ’95-‘98  pre-LGR  SIC92 
a The figures of this variable are supplied by Nomis. 
b LGR = local government reorganisation 1995-98.    29 
 
Startups, closures and number of enterprises: source and description 
The figures on startups, closures, and number of enterprises are supplied by Small Business Service 
(SBS). This organisation publishes yearly figures on VAT registrations, VAT deregistrations, and the stock 
of VAT registered enterprises, based on data from the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR; this 
register is administered by the Office for National Statistics). See SBS (2000). The VAT-registrations and 
VAT-deregistrations represent the number of enterprises registering and de-registering for VAT each 
year. Because there is a turnover threshold for VAT (£52,000 in 2000, for example), the very smallest 
one person businesses are excluded from the figures. The stock of VAT registered enterprises represents 
the number of enterprises registered for VAT at the start of the year.  
 
Employment: source and description 
The figures on employment are taken from the Census of Employment (until 1993) and the Annual Em-
ployment Survey (from 1995 onwards) and are supplied by Nomis. The employment figures only relate 
to employees. Self-employed workers and unpaid family workers are thus excluded from the data. The 
employment figures include both full-time and part-time employees, and relate to the situation in Sep-
tember of each year. 
 
Regional aggregation level and classification schemes 
The regional aggregation level employed in our data set is the British NUTS3 level. This is county level in 
England and Wales, and local authority region level in Scotland. We thus have data at the level of the 
64 regions which are listed in Table 2 of Ashcroft, Love and Malloy (1991, p. 397). In the period 1995-
98, a local government reorganisation took place in Great Britain. The five tier NUTS level classification 
was reviewed, and the so-called unitary authorities (UAs) were introduced. As a result, geographical 
boundaries of some regions have changed. This implies that we have to adjust the data from before and 
after the reorganisation so that they become comparable (see Table A1a). For the English regions, this is 
easy, since the data in the basic file are given in terms of both the new and the old regions (“former 
counties”). But for Wales and Scotland no variables for the period 1994-99 are given in terms of the old 
classification. Closer inspection of the boundaries of the unitary authorities reveals that the Scottish 
regions can remain unchanged but that some Welsh regions have to be aggregated into larger regions, 
due to overlapping “new” and “old” areas. In particular, the “old” counties Gwynedd, Clwyd, and 
Powys are combined into one region (which might be labeled North/Mid Wales), and the “old” counties 
Mid Glamorgan, South Glamorgan, and Gwent are also combined (South/East Wales). This implies that 
the total number of Welsh regions reduces from eight to four (Dyfed and West Glamorgan remain un-
changed), and the total number of British regions in our data set from 64 to 60. These 60 regions com-
prise 46 English counties, 4 Welsh regions, and 10 Scottish local authority regions. In the latter group of 
regions, the Orkney, Shetland and Western Isles are combined into one region. The 60 regions cover the 
whole of Great Britain.  
 
Sectoral aggregation level and classification schemes 
At the regional aggregation level described above, the four variables are all available at the sectoral 1-
digit level. However, from Tables A1a and A1b, we see that three different sectoral classifications circu-
late: SIC68, SIC80, and SIC92. These classifications are all different, see Table A2.     30 
Table A2: Three Standard Industrial Classifications: 1-digit level labels 
a 
SIC68 SIC80  SIC92 
agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 
0  agriculture, forestry and fishing  AB  agriculture; forestry and fishing 
production  1  energy/water supply industries  CE  mining and quarrying;  
electricity, gas and water supply 
construction  2  extraction/manufacture:  
minerals/metals 
D  manufacturing 
motor trades  3  metal goods/vehicle  
industries, etc 
F  construction 
wholesale  4  other manufacturing industries  G  wholesale, retail and repairs 
retail  5  construction  H  hotels and restaurants 
catering  6  distribution, hotels/catering;  
repairs 
I  transport, storage and  
communication 
transport and  
communication 
7  transport/communication  J  financial intermediation 
finance and professional 
services 
8  banking, finance, insurance, 
leasing, etc 
K  real estate, renting and  
business activities 
LO  public administration; other 
community, social and personal ser-
vices 
business and other  
personal services 
9  other services 
MN  education; health and social 
work 
a In this table, similarities in covered parts of the economy across columns are coincidental. 
 
As was the case for the regions, some sectors have to be combined to make sectors comparable across 
different SICs. This results in the six-sector classification in Table A3. In this table, corresponding parts 
of economic activity across SICs are in the same rows. By and large, there are no overlapping sectors in 
this six-sector classification. As mentioned earlier, we do not use the data for agriculture, forestry and 
fishing in our analyses.  
 
Table A3: Relation SIC68-SIC80-SIC92 classifications (1-digit level) 
SIC68-sectors  SIC80-sectors (codes)  SIC92-sectors (codes) 
agriculture, forestry and fishing  0  AB 
production  1, 2, 3, 4  CDE 
construction 5  F 
trade and catering 
a  6 GH 
transport and communication  7  I 
other services 
b  8, 9  JKLMNO 
a  This is an aggregate of four SIC68 sectors: motor trades; wholesale; retail; catering. 
b This is an aggregate of two SIC68 sectors: finance and professional services; business and other personal 
services. 
 
To summarize, the EIM-data set for Great Britain contains the four variables startups, closures, number 
of enterprises and employment. Apart from some missing years for employment, these variables are 
available on a yearly basis for the whole period 1980-1999, at relatively disaggregated sectoral and spa-
tial aggregation levels (6 sectors, 60 regions), and according to uniform sectoral and regional classifica-
tions. 
    31 
APPENDIX 2: The Almon method 
27 
The Almon method is a reparameterization method that corrects for correlation between different time 
lags of an exogenous variable (distributed lags). Correlation between exogenous variables in a regressi-
on model is not desirable as it causes multicollinearity. This problem is often prevalent in the context of 
distributed lags. When the distributed lag variables are highly correlated, it is difficult to estimate indivi-
dual response coefficients accurately and regular t-tests on the significance of individual parameter es-
timates are unreliable. The Almon method assumes that there is some “smoothness” in the lag distribu-
tion. By imposing a specific structure in the lag distribution, the multicollinearity problems inherent to 
free estimation can be solved. In particular, the Almon method suggests approximating the lag structure 
by a polynomial function. This is explained below. 
 
Suppose we have a model of the form represented by equation (A1). 
 
t s t s t t t u Z X X X Y + + + + + + = − − δ β β β α ... 1 1 0    (A1) 
 
where the  X  variables are the distributed lags, with maximum lag length s , and Z  is a vector of 
other exogenous variables (either lagged or unlagged). It is clear that in our model the distributed lag 
variables correspond to the startup rate variables from the various periods. 
 
Due to high correlation between the  X  variables with different lags, free estimation of (A1) suffers 
from multicollinearity. In the Almon method a “smooth” lag distribution is obtained by imposing restric-
tions on the parameter vector β . In particular, the Almon method suggests approximating the graph 
of  i β  against the lag length i  by a continuous function of the form 
 
s r i i i
r
r i ≤ + + + + = ; ...
2
2 1 0 γ γ γ γ β    (A2) 
 
where r  is the degree of the polynomial (A2) and s  is the maximum lag length.  
 
Imposing a structure like (A2) on the estimated parameters is implemented by estimating a restricted 
model. The restricted model is obtained by writing explicit expressions for (A2), and rearranging the 
distributed lag variables, as we will show below for our employment growth model. First, we establish 
the time periods that correspond to the lags 0, 1, ..., s . A straightforward application of our model 
suggests that lag 0 corresponds to the period 1991-1998, while the lags 1, 2, and 3 correspond to the 
periods 1987-1990, 1984-1987, and 1980-1983, respectively. So s  equals 3. Taking the mid years of 
these periods, i.e., 1988, 1985, and 1982, we see that in terms of equation (A2), the values i =1, 2, 
and 3 correspond to time lags of 3, 6, and 9 years, respectively, measured from 1991 backwards. In 
other words, one unit of i  corresponds to a lag length of three years. Second, we have not included a 
startup rate with lag 0 in our model, so  0 β =0. This restriction reflects our argument that startup rates 
do not have an immediate (i.e., contemporaneous) effect on growth and inclusion of an unlagged star-
tup rate in the model leads to problems of reversed causality. Third, we choose r =2, i.e., a quadratic 
polynomial form.
28 Writing out (A2) with r =2, s =3, and  0 β =0 results in  
 
2 1 3 2 1 2 2 1 1 0 0 9 3 ; 4 2 ; ; 0 γ γ β γ γ β γ γ β γ β + = + = + = ≡ = . (A3) 
 
Substituting (A3) in (A1) and rearranging terms results in  
 
() () t t t t t t t t u Z X X X X X X Y + + + + + + + + = − − − − − − δ γ γ α 3 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 9 4 3 2    (A4) 
 
                                                           
27 This appendix is based on Stewart (1991, pp. 180-182). 
28 We consider a first degree polynomial (i.e., a straight line) too restrictive.    32 
Equation (A4) can be estimated using OLS. The (restricted) parameters of the startup rate variables are 
obtained by substituting the estimates of  1 γ  and  2 γ  back into equation (A3). The corresponding stan-
dard errors are obtained using the ANALYZ command in TSP 4.5.  
 
To test the validity of the parameter restrictions imposed by the Almon method a standard F-test of the 
form  
 
() ( ) [] () [] k n S r s S S F R − − − = / /    (A5) 
 
can be applied, where  R S  and S  are the restricted and unrestricted residual sum of squares, respecti-
vely,  r  is the degree of the polynomial (A2), s  is the maximum lag length in equation (A1), n is the 
number of observations, and k  is the number of regressors in the unrestricted model. Under the null 
hypothesis of valid restrictions, the test statistic under (A5) has an F  distribution with  r s −  and 
k n −  degrees of freedom.  
 
In our first application, the number of restrictions  r s −  equals 3-2=1, while the expression  k n −  
equals 59-18=41. The critical value of the F(1;41) distribution at 5% level is 4.1. From Table 4 we see 
that the value of the test statistic equals 0.062, so the null hypothesis of valid restrictions is not rejec-
ted.  
 
In our second application, where we put the employment impact of 1980-83 startups on employment 
growth 1991-98 equal to zero, the number of restrictions equals two. The extra restriction can be writ-
ten as  0 3 = β . Substitution in equation (A3) results in  2 2 1 2 1 2 ; 3 γ β β γ γ − = = − = . So, the extra re-
striction also implies that the employment impacts of lags 1 and 2 (startups 1987-90 and 1984-87) are 
equal. Another implication is that the optimum lag is 1.5 (or 4.5 years). In this case the F-test statistic 
has an F(2;41) distribution (critical value 3.2). The test statistic equals 0.053. So, the restriction  0 3 = β  
is valid. 
 
 